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Masters of the Channel Night:
The lOth Destroyer Flotilla's Victory
off lie De Batz, 9 June 1944
Michael Whitby

t was a dark and somewhat stormy night. In
the western English Channel, off the Ile de
Batz, twelve destroyers, eight Allied (including
two Canadian) and four German, hurtled
towards each other at a combined speed of 4 7
knots. Radar, penetrating the black murk
ahead of the Allied ships, detected hostile
contacts at ten miles range and the force
deployed for action. Minutes later they opened
devastating fire upon a startled enemy.

I

The battle that ensued on the night of 9
June 1944 was the raison d'etre of the lOth
Destroyer Flotilla, a destroyer strike force based
on Plymouth. When planning the Normandy
invasion Allied naval commanders recognized
that although Kriegsmarine surface forces
represented only a limited threat to the
beachhead, powerful destroyers based in Bay
of Biscay ports could wreak havoc on vulnerable
build-up convoys crossing the Channel. 1 But,
because of the dominance of Allied air power,
enemy destroyers came out only in the hours of
darkness. Therefore, to win control of the
western Channel, the lOth DF had to master
the difficult art of night fighting.

I

ailors have never been comfortable fighting
at night. Quite simply, too much can go
wrong. Command and control is confused, the
risk of engaging friendly forces high, navigation
imprecise, collision a constant worry and the
chance of surprise from an unexpected quarter
an ever-present danger. The famous fighting
admiral, Andrew Cunningham, victor of a night

S

battle at Matapan in 1941, summed up these
hazards well for the Second World War era
when he concluded that "in no other
circumstances than in a night action at sea
does the fog of war so completely descend to
blind one of the true realization of what is
happening. "2
In the Channel, quite apart from the
"normal" hazards, Allied naval leaders also
had to face the fact that German destroyers
had consistently bettered them at night fighting.
A devastating example of this superiority
occurred on 22/23 October 1943. While
conducting an offensive sweep off Britanny, a
British force consisting of the cruiser Charybdis,
two Fleet class destroyers and four lesspowerful Hunt class destroyers, was attacked
by five German fleet torpedo boats-small
destroyers that packed a powerful punch. In
what one British participant called "the classic
balzup of the war," 3 Charybdis and a Hunt
class destroyer were sunk by torpedoes while
the Germans escaped unseen and unscathed.
This defeat was painful proof that the Allies
were a long way from the supremacy of the
narrow seas required for the invasion. 4
The officer responsible for winning control
of the western Channel was the C-in-C
Plymouth Command, Vice-Admiral Sir Ralph
Leatham, who had previously served as C-in-C
East Indies and Vice-Admiral, Malta. The
latter appointment had been particularly
valuable as he had directed offensive strike
forces in night operations against enemy
shipping. 5 Since taking over Plymouth in
August 1943, Leatham had pressed the
Admiralty for ships to form a homogeneous
5
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strike force to battle German destroyers but
had been continually rebuffed. The Charybdis
"balzup"" changed everything. Admiralty staff
officers agreed that the reasons for the defeat
were that their ships had vastly different
capabilities, had never been to sea together
and had no night fighting experience. Their
solution was to give Leatham the force he had
pushed for. 6
Specifically, the C-in-C Plymouth wanted
Tribal class destroyers. 7 The beautiful, powerful
Tribals were the British answer to the "super"
destroyers built by several navies during the
1930s. Boastingsix4.7-inchguns, two4-inch
High Angle guns and four 21-inch torpedo
tubes, the big 1850-ton destroyers had twice
the firepower of conventional British designs.
Sixteen were built for the Royal Navy (RN) and
they attracted the attention of the Canadian
naval staff, who convinced their government to
order eight for the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN).
The RN Tribals saw much hard fighting during
the war and, by the time Leatham requested
them, twelve had been lost, most to air attack.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1993

Four RCN Tribals were also in commission but
they, and the one RN ship not in refit or serving
in another theatre, were needed on the
Murmansk run. It was not until the surface
threat to the Russian convoys diminished,
with the destruction of the battlecruiser
Scharnhorst on Boxing Day 1943, that five
Tribals-three Canadian and two Britishbecame available for the 1Oth Destroyer Flotilla,
Leatham's strike force. 8
Equipment fitted in the Tribals, either before
or after their arrival at Plymouth, was vital to
their success at night. Foremost was radar.
British and Canadian Fleet destroyers of the
period received three types of radar; Gunnery
(GA). Warning Combined (WC) and Warning
Surface (WS). 9 For gunnery, all ships in the
flotilla had Type 285P. Designed early in the
war as a high angle set for use against aircraft,
Type 285 had evolved into the standard firecontrol set for destroyers. It provided excellent
ranges, and was accurate enough to detect
"overs" and "unders" and (to the mortification
of operators) incoming rounds. The Type 285's

3
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"yagi" dipole aerials were located atop the
power-mounted director tower and echoes
were displayed on an A-scope where they
caused vertical deflections upon a
horizontal trace. 1° For Warning Combined,
each of the five destroyers had Type 291,
another well-tried unit that could detect
surface contacts at nine miles. The Type
291 aerial was power-rotated and used an
A-scope display.
The set's great
disadvantage was that it could be easily
monitored by the enemy and for this reason
was seldom used until action was joined.
The most effective search radars were
the Warning Surface sets. Unlike Types
285 and 291 which operated on decimetric
and metric wavelengths respectively, the
WS sets were centimetric which gave far
superior performance, particularly for
surface search. HMCS Athabaskan and
the two RN Tribals. Tartar and Ashanti,
were fitted with the recently developed
Type 276 which could detect targets of
destroyer-size outto about 12 miles. Powerrotation allowed consistent scanning and
the antenna was mounted on a lattice
foremast which ensured optimum range.
Echoes were displayed on a Plan Position Commander DeWolf and Admiral Leatham in April 1944
Indicator (PPI) which enabled operators to upon Haida's retumfrom the operation that resulted in the
continuously monitor the positions of loss qf Athabaskan. DeWolf is in his sea rig; layers of
various contacts. This made it a far better sweaters and a scarf around the neck to keep out the cool
search instrument than A-scopes which Channel air. He did not wear a "tin hat" in action.
(NAC PA 180348)
only displayed targets along any one bearing.
Haida and Huron were fitted with the older
and less effective Type 2 71 Q. Performance was
which in the Tribals' case, meant that it was
not too bad (a destroyer could be detected at
located in the searchlight position forward of
approximately nine miles) but its antenna was
the after canopy, only about forty-five feet
manually rotated and, even though Type 271 Q
above the waterline. This not only reduced
could utilize a PPI, Haida and Huron had Arange but the forward superstructure "wooded"
scopes. Another drawback was that the aerial
the beam when it swept directly ahead. 11 It was
had to be mounted close to its power source,
not until stronger lattice foremasts were fitted
in the autumn of 1944 that the two Tribals
could be equipped with the latest search radars.
Opposite: Shown entering Plymouth in July 1944,
Huron displays her forward armament of two twin
4. 7-inch turrets. Type 285P GA radar L<> mounted on
the Director Control Tower at the back of the bridge
(facing rearwards). The X-shapecl aerial at the top of
the tripod foremast is the Type 291 we. while the
perspex shield of her Type 271 Q WS is visible behind
the secondfunnel. (Note how it is "wooded'' by the
forward superstructure.)
(DND)

No matter what their relative merits, these
systems removed much of the risk from
operating at night. Itis important to remember,
however, that radar was still a relatively new,
vacuum tube, technology. Breakdowns were
common, especially under the pounding from
hard steaming or shock from main armament
blast, and performance was often impaired by
7
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climatic conditions. There was not much that
could be done about the latter, but excellent
maintenance facilities at Plymouth and welltrained radar technicians aboard ship reduced
breakdowns.
Other new equipment contributed to the
flotilla's mastery of the night. Navigation,
notoriously difficult in the Channel, was
simplified by the radio navigation aid GEE,
which according to Ashantfs "pilot," enabled
navigators "to pinpoint their position virtually
at the touch of a button." 12 Flashless cordite
helped conceal a ship's position during gunnery
exchanges and preserved night vision. Tracer
for the main armament helped gunners judge
the fall of shot. 13 Each destroyer also carried a
monitoring device known as HEADACHE which
allowed them to listen in on enemy R/T
transmissions. HEADACHE was extremely
useful but it had to be treated with care.
Haida's CO, Commander H. G. DeWolf, recalls
one occasion when intercepts thought to be
from destroyers about to launch a torpedo
attack turned out to be conversation among
minesweepers forming up to enter harbour
some miles away. 14 Finally, the ships were
fitted with the latest IFF (Identification Friend
or Foe) gear which helped ascertain the identity
of various forces.
It was not enough to have good equipment;
it had to be utilized effectively. In his report on
the Charybdis action, Leatham had noted "that
the art of night fighting with the added new
technique of radar has, up to date in this war,
had very little opportunity of practical test, and
in the Plymouth Command, at all events, little
opportunity of exercise." 15 Once his strike
force came together at the end of January
1944, however, Leatham put them through a
concentrated training period that lasted into
March.

Because each ship already had a high state
of individual training, the focus was mainly on
group training which was accomplished
through night exercises. These consisted of
high-speed formation steaming in which ships
manoeuvred at close quarters, and night
encounters, where they launched attacks on
one another. Both evolutions helped the various
departments in a ship become accustomed to

A tired-looking Commander Basil Jones on Tartar's
bridge after an operation.

the demands of night action and enabled the
destroyers to get used to working with one
another. It is difficult to ascertain the exact
number of such exercises the lOth DF carried
out during February and March because most
of the log books of Canadian and British
destroyers were destroyed after the war.
However, the cruiser HMS Bellona participated
in the training and her deck log shows that she
conducted eight night exercises with the flotilla.
The destroyers likely did a few more by
themselves. 16 This is quite a high number
given other operational, maintenance and
training requirements. Interspersed with this
valuable training were several offensive sweeps
off the French coast. The enemy was not met
on these early operations but they provided
important experience and a focus for training. 17
It was not until April that the 19th DF faced
trial by fire. On the night of the 25/26,
Ashanti, Athabaskan, Haida and Huron,
supported by the cruiser Black Prince, engaged
three German fleet torpedo boats in a long

8
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chase down the Britanny coast. The action
was conducted at long range and, although all
German ships suffered damage, it was not
until Haida and Athabaskan caught T-29
attempting to break back along the coast that
one was sunk. Three nights later Haida and
Athabaskan intercepted the two surviving
torpedo boats heading to Brest for repairs. As
before, the Germans reacted by turning away
and firing torpedoes. Although the two Tribals
turned towards the enemy, one of the torpedoes
found Athabaskan and she later blew up in a
massive explosion. Haida gained a measure of
revenge by forcing T-27 aground but T-24
escaped. 18
The lessons from these actions influenced
the tactics employed in the June battle. The
most important lesson concerned weaponry.
In both encounters the Tribals had achieved
good accuracy with radar-controlled gunnery

but results with torpedoes were much less
impressive-in the first action all four
destroyers had fired torpedoes at the motionless
T-29 but, incredibly, all had missed. Not
surprisingly, guns, which were thought to be
much better suited to the fast pace of night
actions, became the weapon of choice.
Torpedoes, however, remained the enemy's
most effective weapon. In both engagements
the reaction of German destroyers had been to
turn away, fire torpedoes, and race for the
safety of one of the many harbours along the
Britanny coast. 19 The challenge facing the
flotilla was to develop tactics that would enable
them to evade torpedoes yet get amongst the
enemy before they could escape.
The officer who solved this tactical problem
was Commander Basil Jones. An experienced
destroyer man, the popular Jones had taken
command of Tartar and the flotilla in March.

Canadian Tribals conducting high speed tactical manoeuvres in the ChanneL
component of the lOth DF's training.

Such exercises were a vital
(NAC PA 151742)
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Although he had not participated in the April
actions (Tartar was in refit). he was well aware
of their lessons. 20 Jones thought that the
flotilla had "to press on into the enemy during
his tum away," but for that to be accomplished
a different formation had to be utilized. The
traditional night fighting formation was lineahead where ships proceeded in column one
behind the other. Its strength was that it
allowed ships to maintain contact but Jones
thought it was unsuitable for the head-on
encounters prevalent in the Channel because
ships were prevented from entering action

together and the destroyers at the head of the
formation screened the radar of those behind.
For Jones the solution was simple:
It was desirable that all destroyers should have their

forecastle guns bearing, their Radar unimpeded
ahead, and ships capable of individual action to
comb enemy torpedoes. Only a reasonably broad
and shaken-out line of bearing formation [in this
case, line abreast] could satisfy these conditions. It
was realised that cruising at night for lengthy periods
in such a formation was a strain as regards station
keeping, although the P.P.I. removed much of the
strain [for those who had it]. Accordingly Line Ahead
for comfort, and Line of Bearing for action, was the
order of the day. 2 1

10
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It took a bold individual to tamper with the
RNs hallowed line-ahead but Jones' unorthodox
tactics, which were supported by Leatham,
were designed to achieve the treasured naval
maxim to hit first, hit hard and keep on
hittingThe loss of Athabaskan at the end of
April reduced the flotilla's strength to four
Tribals but reinforcements arrived in May in
the form of two British and two Polish
destroyers. Of these new ships, HMS Eskimo
was the only Tribal but the slightly larger
Polish myskawica and the sister ships HMS
Javelin and ORP Piorun had similar qualities.
Each had two twin turrets on their fo'c'sles
(probably not a coincidence given the gun
mentality at Plymouth). HEADACHE and GEE.
The Polish destroyers had the same radar suit
as Haida and Huron while the British ships

This heaped much of the onus for success
squarely upon the shoulders of the 19th
Division's commanding officers. It was well
placed. Jones himself, Commander DeWolf,
and Huron's Lieutenant Commander H.S.
Rayner had all established good reputations in
previous wartime commands, and although
Ashanti was Lieutenant Commander J .R.
Barnes' first command, he had proved his
ability on the Murmansk run and in the
Channel. Though all were talented officers,
DeWolf stood a head above the others, a fact
recognized by his fellow COs. In his memoirs
Jones described the quiet, determined
Canadian from Bedford, Nova Scotia "as an
outstanding officer, not only in skill but
aggressive spirit. Furthermore he had that
priceless gift of fortune, . . . of there always

Although this post-war shot shows a sister ship ofZ-32 in British markings, it nonetheless provides a good view
of a Type 36A Narvik. Note the twin 5.9-inch turret forward and three single mounts astern; her two quadruple
banks of torpedo tubes are fore and aft of the secondjunnel.
(DND PMR 92-707; courtesy of K. Macpherson)

had PPI and the latest search radar. What
separated the newcomers from the core of the
flotilla was their lack of training and experience.
The last of them arrived as late as the third
week of May, so there was no opportunity for a
comprehensive night training programme. To
compensate for this, Commander Jones
concentrated his experienced ships in the 19th
Division and placed the green destroyers in the
20th Division. 22

being a target in whatever area he was told to
operate." 23 These talents were all to be key
factors in the June battle.

11
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II

he enemy the lOth DF was preparing to
meet were the four destroyers of the
Kriegsmarine's 8th Zerst6reTj1otille. 24 Although
this German flotilla had good ships, it had
fallen behind its opponents in training and
technology, and had thus lost the night fighting
superiority it once held.

T

Typical of German-built warships, Z-32,
Z-24 and T-24 could withstand a lot of
punishment, and all four destroyers possessed
superb torpedo control gear which made the
torpedo their most dangerous weapon. The
Narviks' gun armament was powerful but the
rate of fire was quite low as the large 45 kg
shells were unwieldy on the pitching deck of a
destroyer. The greatest collective weakness of

Blyskawica and other ships ofthe 1OthDF in the Channel. The pretty Polish ship was thejastestAllied destroyer
in the theatre but her withdrawal from the June action prevented her speed from being a factor.
(NAC PA 180512)

The 8th Zerst6reTj1otille was very much a
mixed bag. Z-32 and Z-24 were Type 36A
destroyers, popularly known as "Narviks."
Displacing approximately 3000 tons, capable
of38 knots, and armed with five 5.9-inch guns
and eight 21.7 -inch torpedo tubes, they were
larger, faster and packed a heavier punch than
Tribals. The smaller, slower ZH-1 was a
captured Dutch destroyer armed with five 4. 7inch guns and eight 21.7 -inch torpedo tubes.
The Type 39 fleet torpedo boat T-24 was the
weakest member of the flotilla. Displacing only
1300 tons and capable of 28 knots, she was
considerably smaller and slower than her
mates. Armament was four 4.1-inch guns and
six 21. 7-inch torpedo tubes. 25

the ships was their wide range of capabilities.
If they were to operate as a unit they would
have to conform to T-24's performance which
deprived the two Narviks of one oftheir greatest
assets-speed.
Although the Germans had pioneered the
development of naval radar, they had fallen
well behind the Allies by 1944. The main
reason for this was that the Luftwaffe had been
given priority over equipment and research,
and the navy mainly received obsolete handme-downs ill-suited for naval warfare. The
ships ofthe 8th Zerst6reTj1otille were fitted with
1940-vintage FuM025 or FuM028, which were

12
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metric sets limited in range and accuracy. 26 Ascopes w~re used for display and had a 30degree blind spot astern, a fact well known to
the Allies. 27 Performance data is scarce but
action reports from the 9 June battle reveal
that their radar indicated a contact on a rough
bearing, but they had little idea of its range and
were therefore unable to establish an accurate
plot. All in all the inadequacy of German naval
radar at this stage of the war was summed up
by historian Arthur Hezlet, who concluded
they "were to the Allied sets as a pocket torch
is to a car headlight." 28
Training was another deficiency. Since
1941, there had been a steady turn-over in
destroyer personnel as experienced officers
and ratings were transferred to the U-Boat
arm. This caused a constant need for sea
training that by 1944 was becoming
increasingly difficult to accomplish as fuel was
in short supply and Allied airpower made ships
vulnerable to attack whenever they left
harbour. 29 As a result, the four warships that
engaged the lOth DF had never been to sea
together before.
The Germans were better off in terms of
battle experience. Since Aprill944 the flotilla
had been commanded by Kapitan zur See Baron
Theodorvon Bechtolsheim, a veteran destroyer
officer who had been CO of the Karl Galster in
many night operations during the first three
years of the war. Later, he served as chief of
staff to the FUhrer die ZerstO'rer (FdZ; the officer
in charge of German destroyers) and was thus
abreast ofthe latest developments in destroyer
warfare. Of the four COs, 30 only ZH-l's
Korvettenkapitan Barkow had not commanded
his ship in action. Kapitan-Leutnant Meentzen
in T-24 had a unique edge: he had twice
survived battles with the lOth DF and his ship
had sunk Athabaskan.

III

T

he 8th ZerstO'reljlotille was pressed into
action as soon as the German naval high
command learned of the invasion. Early on 6
June, Admiral Kranke, the commander of Group
West, ordered Z-32, Z-24 and ZH-1 from the

Gironde to join T-24 at Brest and then head
into the western Channel. The Allies learned of
these plans almost as soon as they were sent
because, since 1941, British cryptographers
had been able to decypher the Kriegsmarine's
"Home Waters" Enigma that controlled surface
ship movements. Fully aware of their intentions
Admiral Leatham ordered air strikes against
Z-32, Z-24 and ZH-1 on their way to Brest.
Beaufighter aircraft (including some from 404
Squadron RCAF) caused light damage, which
delayed the destroyers' departure from Brest
until the evening of 8 June. Further decrypts
revealed their intended course and speed. As
the four destroyers rounded Ushant and headed
into the Channel, Leatham directed the lOth
DF into a perfect intercept position, much like
an air controller vectoring fighters on to a
bomber. At 0114 hours on 9 June, Tartar's
Type 276 radar detected a contact bearing 241
degrees at 10 miles range. Mter allowing the
plot to develop for eight minutes, Jones gave
the order to deploy into line of bearing.
Meanwhile, coastal and shipborne radar had
provided von Bechtolsheim with some warning
of the approach of the Allied force, but it was
only when moonlight exposed the sides of the
Tribals in the 19th Division that he knew they
were upon him. 31
True to form, the Germans turned away to
port and launched torpedoes. Z-32, Z-24 and
ZH-1 were able to pick out clear targets and
each launched four deadly fish at the charging
19th Division-the 20th Division, positioned
two miles to the north was still undetected.
HEADACHE now paid dividends.
Von
Bechtolsheim's order was monitored in all four
Tribals and the combination of this warning,
along with the flexibility of the line-of-bearing
formation, allowed the torpedoes to be avoided
with relative ease. 32
Jones wanted to engage the enemy in a
close-range "pell-mell battle," which resulted
after the 19th Division, followed closely by the
20th (two miles to the north), opened fire. The
German destroyers were in the midst of their
initial turn to port and lay across the bows of
the 19th Division at a range of approximately
3500 yards in the order, from north to south,
Z-32, ZH-1, Z-24, and T-24. As the northernmost
ship in the 19th Division, Tartar initially
13
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engaged Z-32, hitting her four times, but
when she sped off northwards Commander
Jones left her for the 20th Division and
joined Ashanti in firing upon ZH-1 and then
Z-24. Haida first engaged Z-24 but DeWolf.
much to the chagrin of his gunnery officer
who had to lay on a new target, joined Huron
against T-24. 33 From this point the battle
devolved into confusion-the best way to
untangle events is to follow each German
destroyer after the initial clash.
After escaping from Tartar, Z-32 benefitted
from the 20th Division's lack of experience.
Led by Commander C.F. Namiesniowski in
Blyskawica, the division had not deployed
into line-of-bearing but had remained in
line-ahead. Despite this, the encounter began
well. All four destroyers quickly scored hits
on Z-32 but before they could press home
their advantage, Blyskawica's HEADACHE
operator reported that the enemy was about
to launch torpedoes. Rather than turning
towards Z-32, Namiesniowski laid smoke and
hauled around to starboard. The rest of the
division, thinking they were wheeling for a
torpedo attack, followed suit with Eskimo
and Javelin firing torpedoes as they turned.
Then, instead of re-engaging Z-32,
Namiesniowski compounded his original error
by leading the division away from the action
for fifteen minutes. All contact with the
enemy was lost and the division played no
further role in the battle. It was now four
against four. 34
Commander Jones refers to this episode
as "a Polish variation." 35 If nothing else it
emphasizes the value of experience and
training. The flotilla had learned that it was
crucial to turn towards the enemy in order to
maintain contact. Namiesniowski had been
briefed on this tactic but he had obviously
found it difficult to carry out.
Battle
experience would have demonstrated the
necessity of this manoeuvre and training
would have made it easier to accomplish.
Namiesniowski was not the only officer in
the 20th Division to go wrong that night.
Certain confidential publications were
supposed to be destroyed before sorties off

an enemy coast but, remarkably, Javelin's
Signals Officer also destroyed his signal books
prior to leaving harbour. According to his
CO, this blunder (or "British variation," as
Poles may want to call it), rendered Javelin
"completely deaf and dumb as no signals
could be sent out or decoded." 36 Again,
inexperience had taken its toll.
Having survived two tussles with the
enemy, von Bechtolsheim headed west in an
attempt to reform his force. 37 Instead, he
found himself in yet another fight. At 0 138
hours, Z-32 sighted Tartar at close range and
quickly scored three hits on her bridge
superstructure. Tartar's navigator's yeoman
described the devastation wrought by the
5.9-inch shells:
When the actual crashes came upon us the A.I.C.
was plunged in darkness and a brilliant flash
pronounced the end of the Type 293 (sic) Radar set.
Shrapnel rattled around in all directions and soon
the small compartment filled with choking smoke.
Pandemonium reigned for a few minutes on the
bridge immediately above us, and from the
wheelhouse adjoining our action station came the
voice of the Coxswain shouting loudly, "Someone's
been hit" .... Curling smoke swirled everywhere, and
the stench of blood was sickening. 38

One officer and two ratings were killed
and several others were wounded. Fire raged
around the forward superstructure and the
loss of all radar and W.T. gear temporarily
prevented Commander Jones, who was
slightly wounded, from exercising control of
his force. 39 Happily for the lOth DF, the
battle-wise COs of Ashanti, Haida and Huron
knew their stuff.
At this point fortune again smiled upon
Z-32. Tartar had hit her three times in their

brief exchange and von Bechtolsheim tried
to break off to assess damage. As he
attempted his escape, Ashanti, who had been
attracted by gun flashes and a HEADACHE
report that an enemy destroyer was heading
towards the burning Tartar, brought Z-32
under fire. However, before any decisive
damage was incurred, the thick pall of smoke
from Tartar's fires shielded Z-32. Before
Ashanti could locate her in the murk, ZH-1
emerged, "wallowing and helpless." 40

14
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ZH-1 had been badly mauled by Ashanti
and Tartar at the outset of the battle. Among
a deluge ofhits, several shells had penetrated
her machinery spaces, cut all power and
brought her to a stop. When the vast
quantities of steam and smoke that
surrounded her lifted, she lay unveiled before
her original assailants, who quickly finished
her off. Despite her own damage, Tartar
raked ZH-1 with fire from point-blank range
while Ashanti put two torpedoes into her.
Realizing his
ship was
doomed,
Korvettenkapitan Barkow ordered her
abandoned and laid scuttling charges. At
0235 hours, ZH-1 blew up in a massive blast
that was heard all over the western Channel.

To the southwest, Haida and Huron were
pursuing Z-24 and T-24. When the battle
was joined, they had engaged the two ships
which were third and fourth in the German
formation. At 0127 hours Haidaopened fire
with rapid salvoes from "A" mounting ("B"

was firing starshell) at a target to starboard
at a range of 4000 yards. According to
DeWolfs after-action report, the target, which
proved to be Z-24, "just then turning away,
very quickly started to make smoke and zig
zag at fine inclinations. Some ten or fifteen
salvoes were fired at this target and several
possible hits were scored before another
target was observed to the left." 41 Z-24,
which was also briefly engaged by Tartar and
Ashanti, suffered severe damage and
casualties from hits to the bridge, engine
room and forward gun mount. The chaos
caused by these hits forced her to turn away
to southwestward. 42
The situation was equally confused on
She had been totally surprised when
starshell burst overhead and 4. 7 -inch tracer
rocketed by. ZH-1 was being pounded closeby, and the torpedo boat narrowly avoided
colliding with the burning destroyer as the
latter veered out of control. When a Narvik was
T-24.

This shot ofHaida, Tartar and the cruiser Bellona exercising in the Channel shows the nice lines ofa Tribal. Haida
wears the greys and green of the Special Home Fleet Destroyers Pattern camouflage.
(NAC PA 163952)
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seen withdrawing westward, Kapitan-Leutnant
Meentzen followed, thinking it was the leader
Z-32. All this time, his ship was engaged by
Huron and then Haida but, although there
were many near misses, no hits resulted. 43
The battle now took a familiar turn for the
Canadians. In each previous action they had
become involved in long chases; now they
pursued Z-24 and T-24 as they fled
southwestward. Conditions did not favour
Haida and Huron. DeWolflater reported that
the enemy ships:
were engaged with the wind dead ahead and rain
squalls were frequent. Cloud base was never more
than 1000 feet and often as low as 500 feet.
Consequently illumination was poor and starshell
were generally half burned before they effected any
illumination whatsoever. The enemy made excellent
use of smoke throughout and continuously took
avoiding action thus making spotting at time well
nigh impossible. 44

The performance of search and gunnery
radars was also hampered by the poor
conditions. Despite these difficulties, the
two Tribals pounded southwestward at 32
knots and would likely have succeeded in
overhauling the slower T-24 had fate not
intervened.
Under the codename Operation "Maple,"
the allies had laid a series of defensive
minefields along the French coast to restrict
the movements ofU-boats and surface vessels
against the invasion corridors. 45 On this
night they had the opposite effect. At 0150
hours plots kept in the two Canadian
warships indicated that the Germans were
entering minefield QZX-1330. Haida and
Huron were forced to alter course while Z-24
and T-24 steamed through the field of 150
mines with impunity. 46 When the Tribals
resumed direct pursuit they had fallen nine
miles behind the enemy and radar contact
was lost shortly thereafter. At 0214 hours,
because his position "with regard to own
forces and remainder of the enemy was
obscure," 47 DeWolf abandoned the chase to
reform on Tartar. Z-24 and T-24later turned
back towards the battle but played no further
role and eventually made it to Brest.

By this time the situation throughout the
battle zone was thoroughly confused with
both commanders unsure of their own forces
let alone that of the enemy. At 0237 hours,
Commander Jones, his communications
restored, attempted to gain a semblance of
order by signalling his ships to concentrate
on Tartar. To the west, von Bechtolsheim
also continued his efforts to raise his ships
and headed "on a southern course in order
not to get too far away from the battle area. "48
Meanwhile, the Canadian destroyers were
proceeding carefully towards Tartar. Visibility
was obscured by rain squalls while climatic
conditions and the shock from gun blasts
and high speed running had made radar
imprecise and unreliable. Despite this, at
0223 hours both ships obtained a firm
contract bearing 032 degrees at six miles.
Because their plots indicated that Tartar
should bear 040, both DeWolf and Rayner
thought this was their leader. IFF could
provide no confirmation because they could
not be certain that Tartar's gear was not
damaged. According to DeWolf:
At 0230 sighted ship ahead steering a northerly

direction at slow speed. assumed to be TARTAR.
Made identification by light and ordered Plot to carry
out radar search for other ships which might be
concentrating. Ship in sight replied to our signal by
light. but his signals were unintelligible. Main
armament was brought to the ready and the challenge
made, but the reply was again unintelligible. I still
considered it might be TARTAR with damaged
signalling gear and [wounded] personnel. The ship
made smoke and turned away to the west and south
but was not plotted by Radar and range was opened
to 9000 yards before this move was appreciated. 49

Z-32, the ship encountered by the
Canadians, was equally cautious. Von
Bechtolsheim noted that "Individual shadows
are sighted. Exchanges of recognition signals
by blinker gun, and even by night
identification signal, do not lead to any
identification. The fact that, despite German
recognition signal interrogation, these
shadows do not fire, however causes me to
make the decision not to use my weapons." 50
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Z-32 initially accelerated away to the
northwest but over the next 18 minutes
gradually swung around to an easterly course.
After the battle, von Bechtolsheim explained
his thinking:
Standing here alone with Z-32 I can do nothing
against the too powerful enemy, especially since my
reserve torpedoes would first have to be reloaded and
my artillery ammunition is no longer suftlcient for a
lengthy battle. My goal must continue to be to head
east. Since I can no longer reach Cherbourg before
daybreak, I decide to head for St. Malo. I am hoping
that, on my way there and before reaching the
Channel Islands area, I will have the remaining
destroyers with me. 51

Despite Z-32's reaction, DeWolf still had
doubts about the identity of the contact.
Finally, at 0254 hours, starshell revealed the
distinctive silhouette of a Narvik. Both Tribals

immediately opened fire with "A" and "B",
mounts with "X" providing starshell
illumination. Again, shooting conditions were
poor. Dense smoke laid by Z-32 made spotting
difficult but tracer was followed for line and
Type 285 provided precise ranging (von
Bechtolsheim thought the accurate fire was
due to flares dropped from aircraft!). Several
hits were scored but before they had any
telling effect minefield QZX-1330 again
intervened on the enemy's behalf.
Z-32 entered the minefield from the west
at 0311 hours, and Haida and Huron were
forced to alter around it to the northeast. By
the time they had done so at 0342 hours,
Z-32was ten miles to the southeast. Minutes
later radar contact was lost. On Haida's
bridge the sense of frustration was deep as
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Z-32 photographed hard aground on the Ile de Batz the day after the battle. The forward twin turret is pointed
in the direction that Haida and Huron werefiring in thefinal stage ofthe battle. Later that day she was destroyed
by Allied strike aircraft. including Beaufighters from the RCAF' s 404 Squadron.
(DND CN-6870)

"for the second time it looked as if the enemy
would escape through the intervention of
this minefield." Although DeWolf thought it
likely that the enemy would escape into the
small port ofMorlaix, he doggedly continued
the chase with Huron matching his every
move. 52
Like DeWolf, von Bechtolsheim remained
optimistic. Although Z-32 had endured
"numerous heavy and light hits," the damage
was "not severe enough to force me to avoid
another battle."
He expected this
confrontation would occur in the area of the
Channel Islands (presumably because that
was on the invasion flank) but believed he
would have a good chance of success as Z-24
and T-24, thought to be only twelve miles
astern, would have joined by then. This hope
was shattered at 0420 hours when the two
ships reported they were actually 25 miles to
westward and requested permission to return

to Brest. Von Bechtolsheim's reaction to this
setback is testimony to his professionalism:
With a heavy heart I must therefore decide to break
off the mission ordered. In this situation I cannot
force a breakthrough to the east with "Z 32" alone.
Will still have to wait and see whether the
breakthrough to the west will be successful. I
continue to suspect that there are more naval forces
as contact keepers to the northwest of me.

If von Bechtolsheim had possessed good
search radar he would not have had to guess
what lay to the west; as it was his suspicions
proved correct. 53
Since 0412 hours, Haida and Huron's
Type 271Q indicated they were slowly
overhauling Z-32 from the northwest but at
0432 hours the range began to drop rapidly.
DeWolf first suspected that the enemy was
heading south for the safety of the coast but
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it soon became apparent that he was heading
westward and the Canadians altered to the
south to cut him off. Commander Jones had
concentrated the other destroyers about six
miles to the north where he could cut off any
attempt by the enemy to escape eastward.
Z-32 was trapped.
At 0444 hours Haida and Huron opened
fire at 7000 yards range. Z-32, thinking she
was under attack from two cruisers, altered to
the south, returned fire and launched her
remaining torpedoes. The underwater
projectiles missed their mark and although
several 5.9-inch shells burst close to the
Tribals, they caused no damage. On the
fo'c'sles of the Canadian destroyers, gun
crews worked hard slamming 50-pound shells
and 35-pound cartridges into the four 4. 7inch guns. DeWolf initially ordered rapid
salvoes but dismayed by the apparent results,
changed to more accurate salvoes at 0452
hours. Even with that reduction, five or six
salvoes of semi-armour piercing shells roared
out towards the enemy every minute.
Although both DeWolf and Rayner were
unsure if they were hitting, von Bechtolsheim
attests to the accuracy of their shooting. He
had altered southwards "to get out of the
excellent straddle coverage of the enemy gun
batteries. The ship is constantly caught by
hits. The way things are going, my running
won't last long." Except for one brief
interruption Haida and Huron kept up their
withering fire. (Blyskawica briefly joined in
from the north but did not score any hits.)
Sometime around 0500 hours, Z-32's port
engine quit and three hits put "Anton" (the
forward turret) out of action. Hoping that the
"tremendous quantities" of shells fired by
the Tribals would cause them to run out of
ammunition, von Bechtolsheim attempted to
escape along the coast but at 0513 hours, in
the midst of continuous hits, the starboard
engine lost power. Realizing the end was at
hand, von Bechtolsheim ordered the ship,
now engulfed by flames, run aground. Haida
and Huron fired a few more salvoes but
checked fire when they realized Z-32lay hard
on the rocky shore of lle de Batz. 54

IV

he defeat on 9 June 1944 dashed any
German hopes of interceding against
the western flank of the invasion. Not only
had they lost Z-32 and ZH -1 but the damage
to Z-24 took weeks to repair and there was
little that T-24 could do alone. Neither
survivor carried out any further offensive
sorties and, on 25 August, were sunk by
Allied fighter-bombers off Le Verdon. 5 5

T

The Germans attributed the defeat to
their poor state of training, the withdrawal of
Z-24 and T-24, and overwhelming odds. Von
Bechtolsheim's performance was justifiably
praised. The FdZ, Admiral Kreisch, lauded
him as a "daring, experienced and resolute
commander, with excellent tactical skills,
exemplary offensive spirit and a clear
perspective of the battle" who had "brought
honour to the destroyer arm. "56
But for the 20th Division's "inexcusable"
turnaway, Leatham and Admiralty
commentators thought that the lOth DF
would likely have completely destroyed the
enemy. As it was they ascribed the success
to the ability and experience of the 19th
Division, the bold tactics devised by
Commander Jones, and the persistence of
the Canadian ships. The only real criticisms
concerned Namiesniowski's error, the fragility
of some equipment, particularly IFF, and the
failure of ships to broadcast situation reports
throughout the action. 57
From a strictly Canadian viewpoint, Haida
and Huron's role in the battle demonstrated
the ability of Canadian sailors and, with
newspapers filled with accounts of the victory,
garnered much positive publicity for the navy.
The attention was a welcome change for a
service that had spent most of the war toiling
in relative obscurity on the harsh North
Atlantic. To this day Haida remains Canada's
most famous warship and "Hard Over Harry"
DeWolf. who later rose to become Chief of
Naval Staff, her most renowned fighting sailor.
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